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Empire’s Past . . . Empire’s Future
Charles S. Maier, Harvard University
In Fe b r u a r y, a s  I w a s  writing this paper, the Financial Times reported at 
length on an upcoming British Museum exhibition on 16th-century Persia: 
“the third in a series on great world empires,” following a “hugely popu-
lar show” featuring the terra cotta soldiers of the great Ch’in emperor, a 
second exhibition on Hadrian, and to be followed in turn by a show on the 
Aztec emperor Moctezuma II. The director, Neil MacGregor’s “overall 
concept for the series is to study the ‘instruments of cohesion’ that held 
those empires together and ask what the consequences of their dominion 
have been in the long term.”1 And so by means of their artifacts, suitably 
displayed, empires past radiate their light downward to the present, like 
stars after extinction, allegedly educating us all, as Director MacGregor 
intends, in the interconnections of our species. 
Is it “interconnectedness,” as MacGregor believes, that makes empire 
so compelling a theme? Perhaps. A good exhibit does startle or delight 
us by revealing connections between remote societies and ultimately 
our own—whether of art, or beliefs, or commodities, alphabets and cal-
endars, or germs and pathogens. After all, connections are the basis of 
one major contemporary approach to international history—that is they 
are the privileged subject of the contemporary effort to write “entangled 
histories” or what the French call histoires croisées, and the history of 
what many colleagues now like to call “cultural transfer.” And just as 
economists have developed the theory of the firm, as a way of minimiz-
ing the so-called transaction costs of contracts among buyers and sellers, 
Empires, in a sense, have been an institutional device for internalizing 
such cultural transfer. An empire provides a political structure for extend-
ing cultural transfer through time and space. 
Historians divide, as did policy makers, on the nature of that structure. 
For some of us it is a harsh one, built on power and domination; for 
others it has softer outlines and processes that we describe in terms of 
negotiation. Every subaltern people has agency; hence every transaction 
is negotiated—a flight of dubious logic, it seems to me. And for many, 
empire has the sentimental redolence of a wonderful and idealistic project. 
As a Swedish journalist explains what he termed the longest-term geo-
political project in world history, “The empire is gone, but the sun never 
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sets on Portuguese culture. Millions of children, on four continents, from 
the Far East to Africa and the Amazon, do their homework each day in 
the language of Luis de Camões or Fernando Pessoa.”2 Jan Morris recalls 
London in 1944, when she, then a he, was a soldier on leave in London: 
“it felt to me that we truly were part of a band of brothers—thousands 
upon thousands of us, from the four corners of the world, united in al-
legiance and in loyalty under the leadership of the most charismatically 
ornamental imperial chieftain of them all, Winston Churchill. Of course 
my sensations were manipulated [. . .] but they seemed beautiful to me 
then, and they remain beautiful in my memory still.”3 
The sentimentalist vision is hardly analytical; but the negotiated empire 
sounds quite nice and in line with our aspirations for tolerance and norms. 
A recent analysis of the Ottoman Empire, stresses the formation of net-
works and connections as key to the construction of this very long-lived 
and extensive imperial structure.4 On the other hand, it hardly mentions 
the harsh facts of military conquest and expansion. If empires rest on 
networks, the networks often rest on domination and domination on a 
grand scale. When I visit museum exhibits about empires, which I enjoy 
immensely, I am drawn to the large wall maps at the entrances, with their 
settlements and river valleys, spreading around the Mediterranean or the 
interior of China, or the grasslands of Parthia, or the highlands of the 
Andes, and their lines of land and sea communication. Whether they are 
brief or long-lived, it is the spatial grandeur of empire that overwhelms 
me. And the spatiality of empire is defined not only by size and extent, 
although we associate empire fundamentally with bigness. Empires 
work by being functionally differentiated territories. I will return to that 
attribute. For now I cite the exhibits because they reflect the different 
representations or conceptions of empire. Connections or conquest—the 
beautiful artifact that reveals cultural fusion, or the large map that shows 
the multiple sites of empire? How should we envisage empire? 
I.
This reflection thus raises a critical question: Whence our current 
fascination with empire? We cannot deny its challenge as a historical 
subject—especially for those of us who have gathered at this conference. 
It goes beyond just mere analytical curiosity. Was it the Iraq war, which 
set Americans down in the sites of antiquity on a dubious mission? Was 
it the consequence of the brief unipolar intoxication we inherited in 
l991 as the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc communism collapsed? Was 4 South Central review
it a sense of barbarians seeking to invade from outside remote frontiers 
that we sensed with the destruction of the World Trade Towers? Was it 
a cascade of cinematic themes—from Star Wars and War of the Worlds 
to Troy to Three Hundred? Was it the shock of recognition: the slowly 
dawning awareness that having lived as historians and as Americans 
with a narrative of secession from empire, we discovered that we had 
become what we thought we had revolted against? And this in two ways: 
first, the inner evolution of the American democracy from a clumsy set 
of checks and balances to an uncontrolled grant of executive preroga-
tive, and second in our increased reliance on military force in foreign 
affairs. Were we not recapitulating at home—so some of us feared—the 
dangers of the late Roman Republic? Were not the President’s lawyers 
developing the “imperial presidency,” first in the l970s, then under the 
doctrines propagated by John Yoo and David Addington in the presi-
dential administration of George W. Bush? And with respect to global 
politics, were not Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld celebrating the mission of the American state as a force for 
domination by virtue of unchallengeable military supremacy? Perhaps 
we were fascinated because we realized that for all the historiography 
of American ideology in terms of civic republicanism—that is, in terms 
of a particular strand of enlightenment critique of arbitrary power—in 
fact resistance to power seemed simply to melt away and to become ir-
relevant and collapse. At home, it seemed, America’s leaders could not 
resist claims to power; in our new security doctrines they glorified power. 
And empire is “about” power and exerting power. 
Of course, all politics is about power. But democratic politics is about 
the continual contestation of limited power. Imperial politics is about 
the placing of power beyond limits; and certainly for many of us that 
seemed to be the administration’s objective. Still as historians, even if 
we are often motivated by current politics, we cannot rest content with 
narratives keyed to current politics. Our discipline and our scholarship 
never guarantee arriving at a perspective beyond politics, but we are 
enjoined to try. Political concerns may well have helped put “empire” 
on our agenda as historians. It may well have made us aware how it en-
dows the theme or subject with a sort of aura or fascination, an aesthetic 
fascination with violence and inequality, irrational desires to extend ter-
ritory and increase “glory”—all themes that in daily life we try to keep 
within safe boundaries.
But if historians begin with some of the feelings that the concept of 
empire arouses: sentimental memories, justifications, guilty denials—
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arship about empire? How do we get beyond historiographical “shock 
and awe,” to put it crudely? I have already cited the artifact and the map: 
tracing the impact or envisioning scale and structure as alternative ap-
proaches, each valid perhaps, but speaking to different temperaments. 
Can we even presuppose empire as a single abiding political state form? 
Indeed, does it make sense to search for the recurrent traits of empire? Is 
it really so continuous a state form that we can reach back through time 
and compare the empires of antiquity with those of the early modern era, 
then with those of the nineteenth-century overseas empires, and finally 
with the forms of domination exercised by the later Soviet Union, or in 
effect radiated by the contemporary United States? 
II.
Historians rarely escape their eras. My own interest in empire arose 
from trying to understand in what ways the United States—the US that 
had organized a postwar alliance to fight the Cold War, that had then 
prevailed in that contest, and in the years thereafter became involved 
in wars in the Middle East—was a sort of empire. Rather than become 
mired in definitional disputes, it seemed sensible to establish the traits 
that known empires of the past had demonstrated—what I called the 
analog of empire. It was an effort to specify the “imperial minimum.” 
This was the task I attempted in my own book of three years ago, Among 
Empires. The reader, I hope, will forgive a bit of scholarly recapitulation 
as I summarize those results here. 
To suggest that America might be an empire antagonizes many read-
ers. We associate empire with a process of achieving ascendancy by the 
exertion of power. Did America use the classic methods of conquest and 
intimidation? Certainly it did to fill up the continental territory. Did it 
then seek overseas empire, like the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, 
British, Spanish and Japanese? That is debatable: we kept Guantánamo, 
just as we shall keep a massive air base in Iraq after our withdrawal. 
Chalmers Johnson believes that our 700 some bases constitute an empire; 
I am less certain. Bases are enclaves granted by other peoples and states; 
they provide extra-territoriality, but they do not provide the right to rule 
these other places. The retention of the Philippines from 1898 to 1946 
and of Puerto Rico have been classic prizes of empire and the Philip-
pines involved a brutal war to subjugate the adversaries of our control. 
Generally, U.S. policy was oriented on preserving access for American 
business and evangelists, not administrative control. 6 South Central review
What made sense, when I wrote my book, was to think of empire less 
in terms of a process of conquest, than a mechanism for security and 
superiority. I defined empire as a transnational cartel of elites, which gave 
local hierarchies security in return for their recognition of the hierarchies 
at the center as supreme. Empire thus becomes an institutional alternative 
for guaranteeing societal privilege and security. This aroused criticism, 
especially at the outset of my discussions. The eminent historian of inter-
national relations, Paul Schroeder, criticized me strongly for mistaking 
empire with hegemony. Somehow the term hegemony provided reassur-
ances. It seemed less imperialist than the term “empire.” It expressed 
no intention to dominate, but merely the consequence of preponderant 
size and power. Hegemony might arise without a program. The main 
distinction between hegemony and imperium that Paul Schroeder cited 
was that hegemony supposedly did not attempt to rule what happened 
within the territorial units that deferred to them. 
Michael Doyle had drawn a similar distinction in a valuable work on 
Empires almost three decades ago, and the British diplomat and histo-
rian Richard Cooper came to the same conclusion when he spoke at a 
conference on empire in the summer of 2005: “The essence of empires 
is that they impose domestic government.”5 
This distinction has thus become widespread, but I am not convinced 
that it is a robust one. Many imperial powers will not try to control internal 
policies, much less run the states whose policies they can dominate, pro-
vided—but only provided—that the client state does not try to withdraw 
from friendly relations. They must make sure that in their dependencies 
no hostile coalition takes power. If a hegemon thus intervenes to secure 
regime change or policy change when it fears loyalty is evaporating, it 
is perforce behaving as an empire. 
So what criteria distinguish empires? What are the commonalities that 
places labeled empires have shared? What sorts of action does the US 
pursue that earlier empires have also engaged in? After all, what is worth 
knowing is not the name for the United States regime, but the elements of 
American behavior. The stakes are civic and practical. If we Americans 
can’t define exactly what we are, we can say in what ways we are likely 
to act. Thus the task is to explore those aspects of society and politics 
we find throughout the history of empires. 
When we seek to answer this question we have to ask about behavior 
at home as well as abroad. An empire is a type of regime or state, not 
just a pattern of conquest or expansion. The problem, of course, is that 
there is no one pattern or analogue. Historical interpretation remains a 
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ing populated colonies abroad, such as the British, French and Dutch did, 
then the term makes little sense for the United States. If empire refers 
not to colonization, but rather to a less formalized search for decisive 
control by intervening to remove governments we dislike and installing 
those we prefer, i.e., engaging in so-called regime change, then the U.S. 
should be reckoned as imperial, although most American policy discourse 
never describes regime change as imperial. 
If empire refers to political structures at home, that is to a state where 
the executive is given powers of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and 
the representative assembly is reduced to a rubber stamp role, then there 
is room for debate about whether the contemporary United States fits. 
Less now, happily, than was the case before 2006. Most commentators, 
however, probably separate temporary, wartime emergencies, where 
“exceptional” control may be delegated to the executive (as it has been 
at least since the Roman Republic), from regimes that perpetuate excep-
tional control in times of peace as well as war. Empires are structures 
that persist in peace as well as war. To pass through an episode of execu-
tive centralization and suspension of earlier civil rights does not entail 
becoming a different regime. Most such delegations in American history 
seem to have been temporary expedients if not aberrations. They have 
quickly ended. That is why my current answer to the question of whether 
we are an empire is “We came close.” Of course the provisional can be 
indefinitely prolonged—and when the executive claims we shall be at 
war for an indefinitely prolonged period, the situation is rendered more 
fraught. But that danger seems averted.
If empire involves a historical process by which rule over an extensive 
territory is acquired by military expansion, then historians differ over how 
much a process of conquest was involved in filling the continental land 
mass the U.S. acquired from the late eighteenth century on. The question 
also remains whether a state geographically constructed, at least in part, 
by a process of imperial expansion must thereby remain an empire. Do 
the Cherokee removals and the Mexican War remain, so to speak, a sort 
of historical original sin?
My own preference is to define empire in functional terms, that is, in 
terms of what empires have sought to accomplish and how have they 
behaved.6 Empire (so I suggested in my book) is best understood as a 
program by the elites of different national groups to stabilize their so-
cieties, and the distributive norms of their societies, by spatial as well 
as social hierarchy. Empires thus are about inequality across a spatial 
domain; call this horizontal domination. Empires are large enough to 
have differentiated territories that include a center and a perimeter, 8 South Central review
metropole and periphery. But empire is also about vertical domination. 
It helps keep certain groups wealthy and powerful, and it recruits others 
by birth or talent to become wealthy and powerful. And it helps assure 
this inequality within each territorial component. An empire is thus 
an arrangement, whether negotiated voluntarily, or by force, in which 
elites in the so-called periphery accept the ultimate control of elites in 
the metropole in return for securing their own local domination. The 
security sought can be against outside rivals and domestic subversives, 
or both simultaneously. Empires thus rest on collaborators, but they are 
not alliances of equals, but rather structures of inequality—both inside 
their homeland and within the imperial structure as a whole. 
We can get more precise about the imperial minimum, or what might 
be called the imperial syndrome. First, empires tend to pursue a typical 
spatial dynamic. They enlarge territory or influence to confirm their own 
new political order—and then they must defend the boundaries they have 
extended to avoid endangering the expansion just attained. Territories 
once occupied are hard to relinquish—and sometimes for perfectly valid 
reasons of having taken on responsibilities toward the inhabitants who 
might otherwise descend into fratricidal violence. The entrepreneurs of 
empire need not premeditate expansion and continuing control of ad-
ditional territory, although many obviously have done so. Most manag-
ers of empire rarely have a vision of their cumulative power—but like 
a ratchet, their acquisitions conduce to expanded commitments. Every 
time an expanded frontier is stabilized, threats come from just across 
the new frontier. Retreat or retrenchment often seems catastrophic; and 
there’s always an unpacified and menacing site of disorder just beyond 
the limits already reached. Every new border, every new acquisition, 
every new base creates surrounding instability that often calls for fur-
ther expansion. An alliance founded in 1949 to protect West Europeans 
from invasion now finds itself patrolling Afghanistan at the behest of its 
major organizer. 
This means, second, that empires live with the possibility of force. 
They believe themselves summoned to perpetual battle: the idea of war 
evolves from that of a particular conflict to a generalized state of national 
challenge. Empires are often at war. They often arise out of war; they 
maintain their domains through force or the threat of force; they col-
lapse often in conflict—in this respect the end of the Soviet Union was 
a striking exception, although Chechnya reveals that not every region 
might be relinquished easily. And finally empires leave wars behind 
them as a legacy—think of Ireland, Palestine, Kashmir and Nigeria in 
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states are frequently at war, too, but it is more difficult for the empire, 
with its preoccupation with frontiers and control, to forsake the military 
dimension of statehood. Perhaps empires bring peace to the interior of 
their large domains. This was Virgil’s famous description of Augustus’s 
task: To humble the arrogant, raise the oppressed, and impose the habits 
of peace. But there is always combat on some frontier, someplace. For 
each frontier imposed usually means violence just beyond it. The state 
of war becomes the normal state—there are many advantages to such a 
conviction. It justifies an executive politics. Empires maintain decisive 
reservoirs of force—and control of that force is what defines the imperial 
executive. The advent of the nuclear age placed that power in the hands of 
the American president, and according to some analysts, thus decisively 
transformed the constitutional weight of the executive.7
As a consequence of the tendency toward expansion, imperial regimes 
are preoccupied by frontiers. And politics in the empire is often made 
at the frontier and the consequences flow toward the center. Often the 
interventions are direct: I cited them in my book. Caesar returns from 
Gaul to descend on Rome; Bonaparte returns at the behest of his politi-
cal allies from Egypt to seize power in Paris; Britain defines much of 
its politics under pressure from the challenges of Ireland and of India; 
Japanese soldiers in Manchuria drag their governments in Tokyo into ever 
greater ambitions for conquest; de Gaulle organizes the Fifth Republic 
because the Fourth cannot resolve the issue of Algeria and indeed mili-
tary rebellion spreads from Algiers to Corsica. General MacArthur raises 
one of the rare American challenges to civilian leadership after Truman 
relieved him from his command in Korea; and Senator McCarthy attri-
butes the loss of China to the machinations of Reds at home. The claims 
of the frontier vie with grievances at home to shape the politics of the 
Republic. To be sure, U.S. politics undergoes great convulsions because 
of slavery and economic depression—but so it does as well because of 
the lure of Cuba, Mexican possessions, our trade across the Pacific and 
the Atlantic, or our connections in China. Finally, frontiers are never 
simply frontiers—they are also portals across which the poorer popula-
tions of the territories controlled will stream to make a new life within the 
borders of the empire or, in the case of overseas colonial empires, in the 
metropole: whether Ostrogoths, or Pakistanis, Algerians, and Hispanics. 
The imperial syndrome entails a continuing dialogue, but often a violent 
one, between the interests at the frontier and those at the center.
Empires are thus constructed in a dialectical process with those who 
resist. Resistance begins where the borders end, and where the claims 
of rule meet the demands for autonomy. Resistance is endemic; often 10 South Central review
it seems merely bloody minded, petty, reactionary. It does not manifest 
itself everywhere, but at least somewhere. To be an empire is usually to 
confront at least one site of resistance, external or internal. That is one 
reason why anti-imperialists at home are often so ineffective; they do 
not like open resistance which is messy, uncontrollable, and requires 
unattractive allies at home and sometimes supporting enemies abroad. 
The power that empire possesses can finally be contested only from the 
streets; and liberals shrink from that unpredictable mobilization and thus 
are left often to hand-wringing after another fait accompli.
Let me admit that this description of confrontation is too stark. Since 
describing the dialectic of resistance in my book, one critic has usefully 
pointed out that for many colonial subjects of an empire (especially the 
overseas empires that prevailed until after the Second World War), the 
tactic is not resistance, but a sort of transaction or contestation (what 
Frederick Cooper terms “claims making”)—a struggle within the norms 
allowed by the colonizers to achieve as much autonomy and influence 
as possible. The colonial subject carves out domains of relative inde-
pendence in labor relations, local government, and the like, which can 
in fact lead to the dismantling of the colonial project.8 
So far we’ve cited only the dimensions of force and power. But empires 
expand in pursuit of some big idea: the rule of law or “citizenship,” in the 
case of Rome and Britain; of the Catholic Church in the case of Spain; of 
culture, or economic growth, or paradoxically even the spread of liberty 
and democracy. Whether the idea motivates the advocates of empire or 
merely justifies their ventures gets into non-historical issues such as the 
nature of sincerity. Any successful empire needs a big idea. Empires thus 
enlist intellectuals as their justifiers. They support culture. 
These great intellectual constructs often have a common structure: they 
propose at one level a shared interest among rulers and ruled—whether 
salvation, or economic advance, cultural and scientific or hygienic ac-
quisitions—and justify the at least temporary tutelage of those in charge. 
At their base lies a conviction of what post-colonial writers have termed 
“difference.” Only the most predatory empires, such as the Third Reich, 
have suggested that those conquered have no benefits to gain from being 
ruled by conquerors. Nonetheless, the more racially constructed such 
ideas of hierarchy are, the less reciprocity they will allow. 
Empires have another potentially beneficial value; they can nurture 
group tolerance, granting religious pluralism or special role for diasporas; 
they also allow for enclaves of autonomy within their extensive spatial 
domains. They often welcome immigrants, especially those from the 
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flowed into the countries which have often dominated them. This does 
not mean that empires do not assign such migrants inferior roles or that 
they erase racial prejudice. And where migrants achieve high status or 
play key socioeconomic roles within empires, as Armenians or Jews 
or overseas Chinese, they sometimes face murderous backlashes from 
either other subject peoples or the dominant ethnicities of the empire. 
Still, nation-states often impose greater conformity on minority entrants. 
They are high on indices of belonging but potentially low on tolerance. 
Empires can be high on official tolerance, but low on belonging. 
All this means that the imperial syndrome is built on the confidence 
that somehow one’s own state is exceptional, cannot be called to ac-
count by the others and thus should not—that it obeys a higher law. 
“Trust us; we’re different.” American exceptionalism has had a long 
and venerable tradition—but we usually think of it as Tocquevillian ex-
ceptionalism, or that spelled out by Louis Hartz a half century back: the 
absence of feudalism, the existence of religious pluralism, welcome to 
immigrants, and the vast reserves of free and open land. But I am talk-
ing about a sort of less appealing exceptionalism—the belief that great 
power grants great rights—perhaps call it the American Sonderweg. 
Both the British and the Germans had this confidence before l9l4 as did 
most other large states. There was arrogance, to be sure. But what made 
the attitude even more dangerous was the inner reassurance of virtuous-
ness, the belief that ultimately one’s own country’s behavior was more 
responsible than the others’. So, too, the conviction that whatever abuses 
might be uncovered—whether Herrera massacres in German Africa, or 
concentration camps in the Boer War, or Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo 
detentions—were atypical exceptions. 
The imperial syndrome also involves a particular relationship of rulers 
to ruled, of those who govern to their own population. An imperial regime 
searches not for discussion and deliberation, but for approval and accla-
mation. It measures popularity. The media replace parliamentary debate, 
and if there is any symptom of empire it is the attrition of representative 
bodies. Perhaps they are formally kept in being. Even Hitler preserved 
a mock Reichstag. But even in less pathological states, government by 
debate loses its integrity and capacity. Granted, these tendencies afflict 
modern democracies in general, especially when they face complex 
social choice. Decisions get passed to courts as well as to legislatures. 
But the attrition of legislative procedures in a democracy usually arises 
from the complexity of issues; in a proto-imperial situation it results as 
a response to alleged security dangers. Parliamentary delegates accept 
the executive’s diagnosis of danger rather than risk being seen as anti-12 South Central review
patriotic. They pass blanket delegations of power. And even if they insist 
on legislation, the executive claims the right to interpret the laws that 
they might pass. Popularity becomes the ultimate measure. Now if those 
ruling fail in their enterprises they can lose popularity very quickly. But 
until public opinion turns adverse, acclamation, photo-ops, spectacular 
games, staged pageants replace debate. Now there are exceptions: rule 
by committee or by party can continue, as it did in the French Third 
Republic. But even here the issues that define empire and foreign policy 
are withdrawn from the arena of debate and discussion. The executive, 
individual or collective, reserves more and more of them. Empire, like 
authoritarian government more generally, involves the rule of the excep-
tion: there is always an exceptional danger that defines imperial politics; 
and the imperial syndrome embodies Carl Schmitt’s notion that he who 
controls the exception in effect controls even democratic politics. 
The imperial syndrome involves a rampant growth of privilege and 
inequality that corrupts an earlier civic spirit. This does not mean that 
measured by Gini coefficients or other statistical indices society is less 
equal as a whole. Empires can be democratic at home—the British ex-
panded suffrage as they expanded their empire; the French third Republic 
was Europe’s most democratic regime and it conquered Vietnam and 
Morocco—but empires cannot let their subject peoples share the same 
democratic ground rules. And even as they may extend formal equality, 
and even income equality toward the bottom, they give the top immense 
new opportunities for enrichment. This presents grave difficulties of judg-
ment. If millions of middle-income families are each given a small tax 
rebate, while at the same time several thousand wealthy citizens can each 
reduce their bill by thousands or millions, the legislation may increase 
formal measures of equality because of the mass of less affluent citizens 
affected. But who can doubt which distribution has a greater impact on 
civic participation, on the control of the media, or the sense of a gulf that 
separates ordinary citizens from those who emerge enriched? One of the 
curiosities of American public discourse is that growing income inequal-
ity, which is often commented on (although so far hardly contested), is 
discussed solely as a domestic issue. Few commentators who are not 
considered on the radical fringe make a connection between the growth 
of inequality within the United States and the claims that the country 
had made for international primacy.
However, this is the transaction that the imperial syndrome usually 
involves: not robbing the poor to pay the rich, although the periphery may 
be despoiled to pay the center, but fobbing off the humble so that privilege 
becomes more and more spectacular. For a while public games, reality empire’S paSt . . . empire’S Future / Maier 13
TV, philanthropy and the admirable but hardly taxing (indeed often tax-
exempt) charitable deeds of those enriched may counteract the emergence 
of populist class politics. How long that lasts is not at all clear.
III.
These criteria constitute the imperial syndrome. Can a country have 
the syndrome but not be an empire? That question I adjourn. Let me turn 
rather to the taxonomy of empires. Here I wish to make a simpler case, 
and I will make it briefly because it is familiar. Historians traditionally 
have separated landed empires from seaborne empires. The Romans, 
the Chinese, the Carolingians, the Turks, the Russians, the Ottomans, 
were land-based empires. I call them agglutinated empires. They pressed 
outward from their heartland and annexed territories or otherwise subju-
gated them. These were the empires that finally succumbed in the early 
twentieth century, although it could be argued that the Russian one merely 
changed its governing principles. Most territories were in one continuous 
unit although occasionally there could be separate chunks of land, and 
often, in the case of the empires around the Mediterranean, the shape of 
the territory was very irregular. 
Crucial to these units was that rule was relatively homogenous. The 
subjects in the national capital were under the same sort of regime as 
those in outlying districts. Indeed in some instances the outlying districts 
enjoyed special collective privileges or degrees of autonomy that the 
subjects at the core did not. 
The seaborne empires were structures of a different sort. They often 
involved, from the Athenians on, the planting of colonies overseas. 
Their landed core could be far smaller than the vast territories over the 
ocean, as in the case of Venice, Portugal, Britain or the Netherlands. 
The unstable frontiers they faced were usually the borderlands of their 
overseas colonies. Their major strategic and financial problems involved 
sea communications and raising taxes from the colonial regions. Indeed 
where they faced continuing warfare and struggle was at sea; for by 
convention and practicality the oceans could not be cordoned off into 
stable corridors. Instead various exclusionary principles were sought 
and enforced or contested, perhaps most famously the asiento or right 
to import slaves into the New World. 
In these empires the residents at home, in the so-called metropole, 
often enjoyed a level of participatory government that was denied either 
the settlers from abroad, or the indigenous people who were subjugated. 
Indians did not control India the way the British controlled their home 14 South Central review
islands. Queen Victoria could never have made herself empress of Great 
Britain. 
The purest specimen in modern times of the overseas empire was the 
Portuguese, which began with the conquest of Ceuta in 1415 and outlasted 
most all of the others, retiring from Mozambique and Angola in the mid-
1970s. Essentially the Portuguese captured portals for trade and dealt with 
the compradors who could control the resources of the interior, whether 
spices or slaves. Where territories were sparsely settled—preeminently 
Brazil—annexation of vast interior realms might follow. The Dutch, 
the French in the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean, the British, eventu-
ally the Japanese and the United States, were seaborne empires that 
developed enclosed colonies. Still a remarkable transition occurred in 
the late nineteenth century. Control of the portals, so to speak, no longer 
guaranteed access to the interior, and colonies had to be enclosed. This 
development paralleled the general fixation with land masses and their 
permeation, expressed in continental geopolitics, the technology of the 
railroad, the growing rigidity of alliance systems—indeed a whole new 
territorial consciousness.
Alongside of this very familiar contrast, I would place what now are 
called nomad empires. We have tended to think of these as exceptional, 
but in their extent and their frequency they are certainly as distinctive a 
form as either the agglutinated or the seaborne empires. They have been 
called “shadow empires,” “mirror empires,” and “vulture empires,” in 
Thomas Barlow’s formulation of the Mongols’ symbiotic relationships 
with the huge Chinese state structures they co-exist with; and historians 
are starting to analyze them more rigorously, as Pekka Hamalainen has 
done in his splendid book on the Comanches. As Hamalainen summarizes, 
“nomads can destroy empires, but they can also build enduring empires.”9 
To do so, requires a partial transformation at least into sedentary agricul-
tural confederations. What distinguishes them is a often a clan or tribal 
structure, in which descent from an original chief or charismatic founder 
provides a principle of ethnicity and also a concept of territory that does 
not require a fixed-line frontier. The Arabian tribes that exploded across 
the Middle East, the Maghrib and into Spain in the century after the death 
of Mohammed are one instance. The Mongols who surged out of the 
steppe both East and West, the Ottomans or descendants of Osman, who 
overran Anatolia and eventually the Balkans and the Arab states, and the 
Timurids who two centuries later controlled so much of Central Asia and 
might have conquered China were it not for the sudden death of Timur 
are another. As Hammaleine has suggested the Comanche, perhaps the 
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What these peoples claimed was not a well bordered state, but a para-
mount influence over a territory with fuzzy edges, sometimes boundaries 
that shifted with their flocks or the migrations of the wildlife they hunted. 
What they developed with immense skill was the technology of rapid 
movement—preeminently by horseback and archery. What they found 
difficult over the long run was maintaining the dynamic and often bru-
tal principles that helped their rise—whether the fratricidal succession 
principles of the Ottomans, or the restless drive to conquest. Here the 
Mongols and the Timurids were revealing. The attractions of the wealthy, 
sedentary and cultivated states they might conquer were often overpower-
ing. In some instances, such as the Manchu who formed the Qing dynasty, 
they tried to maintain principles of ethnic separation and an ancestral 
homeland even as they insisted on principles of preeminence over a 
landed area, treating the steppe often as the seaborne powers treated the 
oceans. Although termed “shadow” empires when they arose in the wake 
of a settled megastate, or mirror empires, even vulture empires—which 
sometimes both extracted resources and paid tribute—they were network 
societies, not homogenously settled units. They absorbed migrants and 
captives; and as Hamalainen shows, they were vulnerable to ecological 
collapse or to the changed relations between the neighboring states that 
bordered them. We could call them fuzzy-bordered empires. In geographi-
cal extent they were the most imposing of potential state structures, but 
as the concept of bounded territory became more preoccupying, they 
found that their fluidity was no longer the advantage it had been earlier. 
Administration of vast spaces was also difficult, so they often partitioned 
their huge conquests—as did the Mongols and Timurids.
IV.
Nomadic structures, or fuzzy-edged states or confederations are gener-
ally seen as relatively primitive. But in some ways they anticipate a future 
in which deterritorialization makes ever greater strides. This introduces 
some concluding reflections. The great tribal confederations were in ef-
fect pre-bordered states. They flew in the face of the territorial concepts 
that emerged in the early modern period although they maintained a clear 
sense of their own vaguely bounded turf. In this spatial aspect, so fluid, 
and often so extensive, however, they are more post-modern than the 
imperial structures preoccupied by enclosing great swathes of territory, 
painting maps red or blue, and insisting on a homogenous degree of 
continuing unshared domination. If the United States is to be imperial, it 16 South Central review
will have to be on some of the same principles. Pre-territorial and post-
territorial empires share the fact that within a given area of the earth’s 
surface there can be overlapping regimes and communication. Such a 
structure seems propitious for an age in which global communication, 
finance, and deterritorialization has swept us along. The Islamic empires 
were created originally with the deterritorialized force of religious fervor. 
The Turkic empires (Timurids) depend upon the fluidity of boundaries. 
This stage often does not last long since the dynamic conquerors settle 
down to “farm,” so to speak, the wealthy, sedentary and cultured states 
they have conquered. 
Ultimately empires have been forms of social, political and economic 
organization that have relied on the control of extensive space to guaran-
tee their elites’ domination in given areas. Nation-states coveted space to 
assure what they believed were the conditions of sovereignty and survival 
for communities they felt had some long term historical mission or role 
to play. Empires covet space sometimes for its own sake—it is intoxicat-
ing—sometimes because horizontal extension seems to guarantee vertical 
ordering. Such aspirations today may be hopelessly anachronistic. Who 
can plausibly dream of world or continental conquest? Commentators 
whom I admire have claimed that the age of empires has ended. Frederick 
Cooper seeks, I think, to downplay the invocations of empire in order to 
focus on colonialism.10 I would agree that the age of colonial empires is 
over, but while the concepts of empire and colonial empire may overlap, 
they are not, as Cooper himself explains, identical. 
My own view is that a persistent residue of territoriality still clings to 
world politics and to American ambitions for international order. Even in 
the age of the internet and all the processes lumped together as globaliza-
tion, global power is always contested in specific places—whether those 
sites be on the perimeter of control or in the heart of the metropole’s 
cities. It is a mistake to think that globalization and all it represents has 
suspended the importance of bounded territory and location. Political 
contests are always contests over place. Without being able to control 
the security of town centers, or outlying districts, governments are seen 
to be feeble. Control of public space remains crucial, even as so many 
developments in the media and the economy transcend fixed territories 
and spill across boundaries. 
The U.S. imperial zenith may have been only a brief artifact of the 
cold war and the collapse of rivals—first the collapse of the Japanese and 
German empires in 1945 and then of the Soviet imperium in l989–91. 
Who knows where we shall emerge after the current economic turmoil? In 
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is not the United States, but China and Indonesia or perhaps eventually 
some Asian regional entity. Having identified these behavioral proper-
ties, which I believe the United States reveals along with empires of the 
past, one can take up the question again: whether America is or is not 
an empire. I’ve attempted frankly to finesse this question, which I think 
must always be dependent upon definition, to focus instead on struc-
tural similarities and patterns of behavior—on analogue and syndrome. 
Empire—for all of its variations—has been an enduring political form, 
a historically compelling method by which multiple political authorities 
can divide up the surface of the globe on which we live, given that diverse 
ethnic units have had vastly different levels of development. Empires 
have been major components of global politics since antiquity. Certainly 
the United States belongs among the ranks of the powerful global actors: 
it illustrates comparable structural and functional features, and it has 
behaved in some if not all comparable ways.
At the end we have two puzzles: one about the past, the other about 
the future. The one about the past, which I have not attempted to answer 
here is not about single empires but about the prevalence of empire in 
general. Why are certain epochs conducive to the domination of global 
space by imperial forms? And why are others not so favorable?
Consider the era from 1500 to 1650, which comprises perhaps the 
apogee of landed and nomad empires, encompassing the Americas, 
much of Europe, the Mediterranean, Central Asia, South Asia, and East 
Asia. Consider the centuries from 1700 to 1950 as an apogee of seaborne 
empire. We know empires decompose and reconstitute themselves. What 
forces provide such widespread transformation: is it technological op-
portunity: the horse, artillery, the railroad and the steamship?11 Because if 
it is, then the future of empire will depend upon these factors as well. In 
general, though, I believe that empires generate other empires—whether 
competitively or in the process Barsfield outlines. They tend to prosper 
or decline in tandem, and in rhythms that we haven’t fully identified.
As for the future, if compelled to wager, I think that the most likely 
long-term organization of world politics will involve increasing levels 
of supranational association without imperial hierarchization, and the 
development of regional associative blocs, much like the European 
Union. But there is an alternative in which the functions of governance are 
decomposed and overlaid on each other, much like those celluloid maps 
that fancy atlases allowed so that the reader could superimpose ethnic-
ity, economic resources, religious loyalties, and political organization. 
In such a future, sovereignty and functionality would be decomposed so 
that no encompassing political control existed. Territoriality would lose 18 South Central review
its meaning in that situation, there would be zones in which respectively 
media, communications, religious federations, financial networks, and 
sports federations would slide on top of each other—none claiming old-
fashioned sovereignty, each claiming the right of unimpeded pursuit of its 
own objectives, as do market-oriented economic units today. Curiously 
enough, the great edgeless empires perhaps allow us to glimpse that sort 
of world. They remind us, too, how violent such a world might become. 
Hence three possible futures seem plausible: a coming global order with 
multiple EU-like units; or alternatively, governance organized in terms 
of layered functionality; or perhaps, finally, if economic difficulties 
persist, the world redivided into revived national protective units. Even 
if empire has no future, its history will remain relevant because even 
today spatiality remains a resource for power and for controlling future 
life outcomes. Empire has represented what might today be a dream and 
perhaps even an irrelevance: that society’s life is secured by controlling 
land and oceans. But in undreamed of forms, perhaps the history of 
empire begins anew. 
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